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EXECUTIVE OVERREACH AND RECEss APPOINTMENTS
Senator Roger Wicker*
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental principle of our system of government is adherence to
the rule of law,'and one of the actions taken by those elected to the United
States presidency is swearing to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States.2 Regrettably, on multiple occasions, our current
President has circumvented the rule of law, undermining the checks and
balances conceived by the Framers whenever they have impeded his
agenda. He has aggressively pursued new and troubling expansions of ex-
ecutive branch power.
One of the more egregious examples of the President's overreach of
executive branch authority occurred on January 4, 2012, when he unilater-
ally sought to install Richard Cordray as the new head of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau and named three individuals to serve as mem-
bers of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).' In making these
four "appointments"-classifying them as "recess appointments" even
though the Senate was not meeting regularly-the President ignored nearly
a century of legal precedent.
Significantly, a three-member panel for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has agreed, concluding in Noel Canning v. National Labor Relations
Board that the President may make recess appointments only during inter-
session recesses and only for vacancies that come into being during such
intersession recesses.' In its decision, the Noel Canning court explained that
the President's purported recess appointments of three NLRB members on
January 4, 2012, did not take place during "the Recess of the Senate" be-
cause "the Recess," as used in the Constitution's Recess Appointments
Clause, is limited to intersession recesses.' Allowing presidential appoint-
ments to be made without Senate consent during intrasession recesses,
* The Honorable Roger F. Wicker is a United States Senator from Mississippi. Senator Wicker
earned his law degree from the University of Mississippi in 1975.
1. As explained by Thomas Paine in his 1776 pamphlet, Common Sense: "In America THE
LAW IS KING! For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be
king; and there ought to be no other." Christopher L. Tomlins, In America The Law is King!, in 19 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 1 (2008) (citing Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776), and
noting that "[tihe power and position of law are apparent throughout American history, from its earli-
est moments").
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI. cl. 3.
3. Sharon Block, Terence Flynn, and Richard Griffin were appointed to the NLRB on this date.
4. Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013). The Canning opinion was decided
immediately prior to this Article's publication. It remains to be seen whether the President's adminis-
tration will appeal the adverse decision.
5. See Id. at 18.
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rather than intersession recesses,' "would wholly defeat the purpose of the
Framers in the careful separation of powers structure reflected in the Ap-
pointments Clause."' A sitting president could simply dispense with the
Senate's advice and consent by waiting until the Senate took a break (how-
ever brief) to make his appointments, the court explained.' The Noel Can-
ning court also found that the term "happen," as it is used in the Recess
Appointments Clause, means that the President may make recess appoint-
ments only if a vacancy "arises" or "begins" or "comes into being" during
"the Recess."9 By unilaterally making these so-called "appointments" of
preexisting vacancies after the second session of the 112th Congress had
already convened on January 3, 2012, President Obama violated the
Constitution.10
With these "appointments," President Obama pushed executive
branch overreach to a new, more troubling level in violation of both the
Constitution and past practices of prior presidents. The President could
have relied upon the routine appointment process under Article II of the
United States Constitution, which gives the President the authority to nom-
inate" and the Senate the authority to reject or to confirm such appointees
under Article 11.12 In this instance, however, he did not use the standard
processl 3 because he anticipated that the United States Senate would never
confirm his choice to head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau-an
agency whose current structure was opposed by a significant number of
Senators due to its lack of transparency and accountability.
Such opposition, however, is not a valid constitutional reason for the
President to install several of his "appointees" to office in violation of the
Article II Appointments Clause.14 His is precisely the type of conduct that
6. An intersession recess refers specifically to the time period between one session of the Sen-
ate and the next; therefore, "'the [term] Recess' should be taken to mean only times when the Senate is
not in one of those sessions, formally ending upon the ensuing session of the Senate." Id.
7. Id. at 23.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 30-31.
10. The court considered whether "happen" means "arise" or "begin" or "come into being" dur-
ing "the Recess," or, conversely, whether the President may fill up any vacancies that "happen to exist"
during "the Recess." Id. The court settled on the former interpretation of "happen," reasoning that
similar wording elsewhere in the Constitution supports such an interpretation, and that a contrary inter-
pretation would eviscerate the primary Article II method of appointments. Id. at 32. As stated in the
decision: "vacancy happens, or 'come[s] to pass,' only when it first arises, demonstrating that the Re-
cess Appointments Clause requires that the relevant vacancy arise during the recess. The term 'happen'
connotes an event taking place - an action - and it would be plainly incorrect to say that an event
happened during some period of time when in fact it happened before that time." Id. at 31.
11. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
12. Id.; see also HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS21308, RECESS APPOINTMENTS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONs (2012) (Summary).
13. Michael A. Carrier, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments
Clause? 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2208 (1994) ("There is a less urgent need to fill vacancies that exist
during brief recesses because the President can rely on the standard appointment process, which occurs
when the Senate promptly reconvenes."). President Obama did not give the Senate any meaningful
opportunity to confirm his NLRB nominees: he left these NLRB positions vacant for several months
before making the "appointments" on January 4, 2012.
14. Id. at 2205 n.9.
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would have troubled the Framers, who were candid about the crucial link
between the separation of powers and freedom itself, warning in the Feder-
alist Papers of the encroaching nature of power:
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging
to one of the departments ought not to be directly and com-
pletely administered by either of the other departments. It
is equally evident, that none of them ought to possess, di-
rectly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others,
in the administration of their respective powers. It will not
be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature, and that
it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits
assigned to it.1"
The Framers carved out one constitutional exception, known as the
Recess Appointments Clause, to the standard requirement of eliciting Sen-
ate advice and consent to presidential appointments. White House lawyers
have relied upon this exception, which is found in clause 3 of Article II,
section 2,16 as the supposed justification for the President's action in unilat-
erally appointing executive branch officers." The clause grants to the Pres-
ident the "[plower to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess of the Senate by granting Commissions which shall expire at the
End of their next session."1" The President's lawyers have argued (and
likely will assert on appeal) that the President's January 4, 2012, "appoint-
ments" effectively occurred during a "Recess of the Senate," and therefore
the Recess Appointments Clause applies.19 However, the conditions for a
Senate "Recess," which would trigger this exception to the Appointments
Clause, did not exist on January 4, 2012, and thus the President's action of
unilaterally trying to install senior appointees to office was illegitimate.
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S APPOINTMENTS
A. Congress Was Not In An Intersession Recess on January 4, 2012.
For the purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, the term "Re-
cess" of the Senate refers to a break in Senate proceedings that occurs
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323-24
(James Madison).
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363, 1367-68 (D.D.C. 1973)
("The constitutional provision governing the appointment of federal officials is clear in its mandate.
Unless Congress has vested the power of appointment of an officer in the President, the Courts, or a
Department head, he may be appointed only with the advice and consent of the Senate, unless that
body is in recess.").
17. Carrier, supra note 13, at 2206 n.17 (citing Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C.
1973)).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
19. Virginia A. Seitz, Asst. Att'y. Gen. for the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Lawfudness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma
Sessions, JUSTICE.Gov (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf
(Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President).
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following a "session" of the Senate. 20 When President Obama made these
"appointments" on January 4, 2012, Congress had already begun a new
session.
Article I also specifies that neither chamber may take a break, or a
recess, of more than three days without the consent of the other.2 1 Consis-
tent with this requirement, U.S. House Rules stipulate that adjournments
of less than three days shall occur by means of a motion, adjournments of
more than three days require the consent of the Senate,2 2 and adjourn-
ments sine die (ending each session of Congress) require the consent of
both chambers. 23 However, neither chamber of Congress had consented to
the other's adjournment on the date the President sought to make these
"appointments."
For both of these reasons, Congress was not in "the Recess" period
envisioned by the Constitution.
B. The Senate on January 4, 2012, Was Capable of Providing
Its Advice and Consent.
In recent decades, the overwhelming consensus among past U.S. At-
torneys General has been that recess appointments should be limited to
circumstances in which the Senate is unable, by virtue of a lengthy recess,
to provide the advice and consent necessary to confirm or reject a senior
government official.2 4 While some Attorneys General have disagreed on
precisely what criteria must be met to render the Senate incapable of pro-
viding such advice and consent, the consensus view in recent decades is that
20. HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21308, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FRE-
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2012).
21. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 4 ("Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the
two Houses shall be sitting").
22. HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21308, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FRE-
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2012). Hogue notes that the required consent of one chamber to
another chamber's recess typically is granted to the other chamber by passing a concurrent resolution:
"Congress adjourns sine die by adopting a concurrent resolution through which each house grants per-
mission to the other to adjourn sine die. These adjournment resolutions today usually authorize leaders
of each chamber to call it back into session after the sine die adjournment. If this power is exercised,
the previous session resumes and continues until the actual sine die adjournment is determined, usually
pursuant to another concurrent resolution . . . ." Id.
23. William H. Brown, Charles W. Johnson & John V. Sullivan, U.S. House of Representatives,
112th Cong., House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents, and Procedures of the House, GPO.Gov
2 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-112/pdf/GPO-HPRACTICE-112.pdf.
24. The U.S. Department of Justice's Office of the Solicitor General stated, in a 2004 brief to the
United States Supreme Court, "[t]o this day, official congressional documents define a 'recess' as 'any
period of three or more complete days-excluding Sundays-when either the House of Representa-
tives or the Senate is not in session." Brief for the United States in Opposition, Miller v. United States,
No. 04-38 (11th Cir. 2004), 2004 WL 1206955, available at http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2004/Ore-
sponses/2004-0038.resp.pdf. The Deputy Solicitor General, Neil Katyal, also stated: "The recess ap-
pointment power can work in - in a recess. I think our office has opined the recess has to be longer than
3 days." Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, New Process Steel v. Nat'I Labor Relations Bd., 130 S. Ct.
2635 (2010) (No. 08-1457), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/_transcripts/08-
1457.pdf. See Recess Appointments, 41 Op. Att'y. Gen. 463, 468 (1960); see also Recess Appointments
During an Intrasession Recess, 16 U.S. Op. O.L.C. 15 (1992) (noting that the President could make a
recess appointment during an intrasession recess from January 3, 1992, to January 21, 1992).
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adjournment for a period of less than three days cannot be construed as a
recess of the Senate for purposes of the Appointments Clause.25
As far back as 1921, even U.S. Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty,
in opining that the term "Recess" must be given its practical meaning,
clarified:
No one, I venture to say, would for a moment contend that
the Senate is not in session when an adjournment [of under
three days] is taken. Nor do I think an adjournment for 5 or
even 10 days can be said to constitute the recess intended by
the Constitution. 26
The notion that the Senate may convene pro forma sessions in which it
has the capacity to act to prevent the occurrence of recess appointments is
also not new. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nevada, publicly ar-
ticulated this view during a November 2007 speech on the floor of the U.S.
Senate, stating that "[t]he Senate will be coming in for pro forma ses-
sions . . . to prevent recess appointments." 2 7 As recently as two years ago,
the President's own Solicitor General confirmed the legitimacy of Senator
Reid's view that the "Senate may act to foreclose the ability of the Presi-
dent to make recess appointments" by not recessing for several consecutive
days at a time over a lengthy period.28
As further clarified by a member of the President's own political party,
former U.S. Senator Robert Byrd, D-West Virginia:
Recess appointments should be limited to circumstances
when the Senate, by reason of a protracted recess, is incapa-
ble of confirming a vitally needed public officer. Any other
interpretation of the Recess Appointments clause could be
seen as a deliberate effort to circumvent the Constitutional
25. As noted by the Congressional Research Service (the research arm of the Library of Con-
gress), until President Obama made these appointments, no other U.S. President at any time in the past
three decades had made a recess appointment in a shorter recess than 11 days for an intersession recess
(10 days for an intra-session appointment). HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21308,
RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 3 (2012) (also cited in a letter dated Jan. 6,
2012, to Eric H. Holder, U.S. Att'y. Gen., from Republican members of the U.S. Sen. Judiciary
Comm.). See also George Will, Editorial, Obama's Selective Defense of the Constitution, WASH. PosT.
Oct. 11, 2012 ("In 1993, during a federal court case, the United States Department of Justice argued
that "[i]f the recess here at issue were of three days or less, a closer question would be presented. The
Constitution restricts the Senate's ability to adjourn its session for more than three days without ob-
taining the consent of the House of Representatives."). Id.
26. Executive Power-Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att'y. Gen. 20, 25 (1921).
27. 153 CONG. REC. S14,069 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2007) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid,
D-Nevada). See also Republican Policy Comm., Reid Doubles Down on Senate Dysfunction, SEN. RE-
PUBLICAN POLICY COMM. (July 24, 2011), http://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/reid-doubles-down-
on-senate-dysfunction ("In 2007, the Majority Leader pioneered the practice of keeping the Senate in
session on a pro forma basis to prevent President Bush from making recess appointments.").
28. Letter from Elena Kagan, Solicitor Gen., to The Hon. William K. Suter, Clerk. U.S. Supreme
Court (Apr. 26, 2010).
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responsibility of the Senate to advise and consent to such
appointments.2 9
Senator Byrd's view is also consistent with that of leading legal schol-
ars, who have explained how practical constraints dictated the inclusion of
the Recess Appointments Clause in Article II of the Constitution. 30 Schol-
ars have noted that the Framers regarded this method of recess appoint-
ment as merely a supplement to, and not typically a substitute for, the usual
appointments process." Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 67, confirms
that this clause was designed to be invoked only when the general method
of appointments was inadequate,3 2 arguing that "it would have been im-
proper" to expect the Senate to be in session continually.33 In reaching its
decision, the Canning court relied on this same historical interpretation.34
In this case, the U.S. Senate on December 17, 2011, agreed by unani-
mous consent to hold pro forma sessions every three days for the next sev-
eral weeks (i.e., each Tuesday and Friday between December 17, 2011, and
January 23, 2012) rather than to adjourn.35 During the pro forma sessions
that followed, members of Congress introduced bills, convened committee
meetings, and filed committee reports.3 6 On December 23, 2011, the Sen-
ate passed payroll tax extension legislation, agreed to go to conference with
29. Letter from Robert Byrd, U.S. Senator, D-W. Va., to Ronald Reagan, Pres. of the United
States (July 30, 1985), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/roberts/Box47JGRRecessAppoint
ments4.pdf.
30. See, e.g., VIVIAN CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A LEGAL
OVERVIEW 1, 2 (2012) ("[I]t is generally accepted that the [Recess Appointments] Clause was designed
to enable the President to ensure the unfettered operation of the government during periods when the
Senate was not in session and therefore unable to perform its advice and consent function . . . .")
(footnotes omitted); Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments? A Comment on Hartnett (And
Others), 26 CARDOzo L. REV. 443, 444 (2005) ("The clause represents a minor and pragmatic adjust-
ment to the basic appointments procedure, added to account for a particular set of circumstances.").
31. Herz, supra note 30, at 444.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 409-10 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Herz, supra note 30, at
444-45 ("[t]he many Attorney General opinions concerning the clause operate from the premise that its
purpose is to prevent disruptive delays in filling vacancies"); Carrier, supra note 13, at 2221 n. 93
("[u]nlike today's Senate, the Senate of the late eighteenth century was not able to receive messages
from the President during recesses.").
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 409-10.; see also Carrier, supra note 13, at 2206 ("[t]he Framers
adopted the clause apparently to keep the government functioning during the six-to-nine month re-
cesses in which Senators were dispersed throughout the country and were unable to convene to provide
their advice and consent"). See also VIVIAN CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33009, RECESS AP-
POINTMENTs: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 2 (2012) ("[T]he idea of the recess appointment power as a practical
accommodation is supported by the fact that until the Civil War, Congress consistently met for rela-
tively short sessions followed by long recesses of six to nine months."); HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN
BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42329, RECESS APPOINTMENTS MADE By PRESIDENT BARACK
OBAMA (2012).
34. Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115, slip op. 22 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013)
35. See 157 CONG. REC. S8,783-84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden,
D-Oregon).
36. See, e.g., Open Executive Session to Consider Executive Branch Nominations of U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance (Dec. 17. 2011): Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2055, Military Con-
struction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2012, as agreed to in
Senate (Record Vote No. 235 on Dec. 17, 2011); H.R. 3765, Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation
Act of 2011, as introduced by U.S. Rep. David Camp, R-Mich. (Dec. 23, 2011).
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the House, agreed on the ratio of House and Senate conferees, and ap-
proved conferees. The President then signed into law the payroll tax exten-
sion that the Senate had passed during just such a pro forma session. 7 By
signing this tax measure, the President implicitly acknowledged that the
Senate had capacity to fulfill its role in the appointments process during a
pro forma session.
In summary, when President Obama made his four "appointments" on
January 4, 2012-scarcely two weeks after the Senate passed a payroll tax
extension measure-he violated Article I of the Constitution, ignored the
procedural rules adopted by each chamber of Congress, and swept aside
longstanding precedent established by numerous former Attorneys Gen-
eral. It is particularly illustrative that the Obama administration has only
recently called into question the legitimacy of pro forma sessions, even
though the President has previously urged the adoption of legislation dur-
ing just such sessions. The business conducted during the pro forma session
on December 23, 2011, was substantively no different than that of the pro
forma sessions that followed. Under this administration's interpretation, it
seems that the validity of a Senate session is subject to the discretion of the
President.
C. The Senate Has Constitutional Authority to Control
Its Own Proceedings.
In advancing a different, flawed justification for the President's Janu-
ary 4, 2012, "appointments," Assistant Attorney General Virginia Seitz
wrongly advises in a memorandum that despite the Senate's convening of
pro forma sessions to prevent recess appointments, the President "has dis-
cretion to conclude that the Senate is unavailable to perform its advise-
and-consent function" during a pro forma session." On this mistaken ba-
sis, Seitz then concludes that the President's January 4, 2012, "appoint-
ments" during a pro forma session of the Senate did not require the
Senate's advice or consent.39
Such an interpretation-that the President rather than the Senate has
the discretion to determine when the Senate is unable to fulfill its advise-
and-consent function-is inconsistent with Article I of the Constitution.
Article I empowers the Senate to adopt rules for its own proceedings;4 0 in
this case, the Senate had already decided to conduct pro forma sessions.4 1
No constitutional provision confers any authority on the Chief Executive to
override Senate decisions governing Senate proceedings in the event of a
conflict or to decide, contrary to the decision of the Senate, that the Senate
37. After both chambers passed H.R. 3765. or the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act
of 2011. Pub. L. No. 112-78. by voice vote on December 23, 2011, President Obama signed the measure
that same day.
38. Seitz, supra note 19, at 1.
39. Id. at 23.
40. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5 ("Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . .
41. See 153 CONG. REC. S14,069 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2007) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid,
D-Nevada).
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lacks the ability to fulfill its advise-and-consent function for purposes of the
Recess Appointments Clause.
This President's approach essentially employs the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause as a loophole to evade the Article II appointments process.
Followed to its logical conclusion, such an approach could lead this Presi-
dent, or a future one, to make unilateral "Recess" appointments of contro-
versial nominees at any time (e.g., during lunch or in the middle of the
night) when it suits the Chief Executive's interests.4 2 The Framers certainly
never intended that the Recess Appointments Clause of Article II become
a loophole to be exploited by the President or his lawyers.4 3
II. CONCLUSION
Many federal lawmakers expressed outrage over the President's action
of unilaterally attempting to install several senior nominees to office on
January 4, 2012. While Republicans were the most vocal in voicing their
objections to these illegitimate "appointments,"4 4 Democrats have also
previously voiced concerns about presidential attempts to evade the consti-
tutional requirement of advice and consent to nominations.4 5 A day after
the appointments were made, former Attorney General Edwin Meese III
and former Office of Legal Counsel lawyer Todd Gaziano wrote in The
Washington Post that President Obama's move is "a constitutional abuse of
a high order."46
The controversy surrounding the President's non-recess appointments
has nothing to do with the personal character of Mr. Cordray or those
named to the National Labor Relations Board. Nor is the debate over
whether the President has the power to make recess appointments when
the Senate legitimately is in recess. What the President has done tran-
scends party issues and ideological divides. President Obama ignored in-
convenient provisions of the Constitution and overstepped his authority
through his actions on January 4, 2012. The President put his own interests
42. Timothy Noah, Cordray's Recess Appointment Sure Doesn't Look Constitutional To Me, THE
NEw REPUBLIC (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/blog/timothy-noahl99229/cordrays-recess-appoint
ment-sure-doesnt-look-constitutional-me# ("The trouble with this definition is that it would define as a
Senate recess just about every weekend of the year.").
43. 131 CONG. REC. S11,018 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985) (statement of Sen. Robert C. Byrd, D-West
Virginia) ("The President's lawyers know full well that the recess appointment clause which appears in
the U.S. Constitution was not created as a political loophole to thwart the will of the Senate.").
44. See, e.g., Letter to Eric H. Holder, U.S. Att'y. Gen., from Republican members of the U.S.
Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 6, 2012) (on file with the author).
45. See, e.g., Press Release. U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi, D-Cal., President's Recess Ap-
pointment Of John Bolton Is A "Mistake" (Aug. 1. 2005) (on file with the author); U.S. Senator Dick
Durbin, D-Ill.. 151 CONG. REC. S6,253 (daily ed. June 9. 2005) (statement of Sen. Dick Durbain.
D-Illinois) ("I agree with Senator Kennedy that Mr. Pryor's recess appointment, which occurred during
a brief recess of Congress, could easily be unconstitutional . . . . Recess appointments lack the perma-
nence and independence contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution.").
46. Edwin Meese III & Todd Gaziano, Obama's recess appointments are unconstitutional, WASH.
Pos-r (Jan. 5. 2012). http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-05/opinions/35438016-1-senate-recess-
senate-session-richard-cordray.
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above the law, denying America's elected representatives the opportunity
to legislate on behalf of their constituencies.
A number priorities demand Congress's undivided attention right
now, not least of which are fixing the economy and putting Americans back
to work. Whether or not President Obama's administration chooses to ap-
peal the Noel Canning decision, we need a successful working relationship
between the legislative and executive branches. Ultimately, the President's
recent power grab undermines the very constitutional foundation of this
relationship. Our government's separation of powers is not an antiquated
idea but is instead a timeless safeguard to liberty.

